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A VISION FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE:
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE HOFSTRA
COLLABORATIVE LAW CONFERENCE
J. Herbie DiFonzo*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2009, Hofstra University School of Law's Center for
Children, Families and the Law hosted a Conference on the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act, in conjunction with the Uniform Law
Commission, the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, the
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals ("IACP"), and the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution. This event
marked the first time a law school has sponsored a conference
exclusively focusing on the innovative practice of collaborative law.
The goal of the Conference was to assess collaborative practice in
light of the adoption of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act ("UCLA").
Specifically, the Conference Working Groups sessions addressed the
central legal and practical issues in collaborative law, and began the
process of evaluating how the new practice modality alters the way
lawyers approach dispute resolution. This Final Report summarizes the
work of the Conference and addresses the vision of collaborative
practice for twenty-first-century lawyers, as well as for mental health
and financial professionals.'
* Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Hofstra University
School of Law. My thanks to those who helped me so much in thinking about these issues and in
drafting this Report: Ruth C. Stern, Andrew I. Schepard, Franca Sachs, and Patricia Kasting. I also
thank the law student reporters to the Conference Working Groups (whom I credit in the text), as
well as the Working Group facilitators whose efforts were vital to the success of the Conference:
Sherrie R. Abney, Maria Alba-Fisch, Yishai Boyarin, Nancy Cameron, Gay G. Cox, Diane S. Diel,
Gary Direnfeld, Jennifer Gundlach, Jim Hilbert, Neil E. Kozek, Katharine S. Lazar, Theo
Liebmann, Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., Forrest S. Mosten, Susan Miller, James Sample, Arnold T.
Shienvold, Roy D. Simon, Jr., Jana Singer, Sherri Goren Slovin, and Nancy Ver Steegh. All these
individuals can be credited; only I can be blamed for any flaws.
1. The term "collaborative law" refers to the legal dimensions of "collaborative practice" as
embodied in the UCLA. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421
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Eight Hofstra law students served as student reporters for the
Conference. They worked under my direction, with assistance from
Professor Andrew Schepard, the Reporter for the UCLA, and Franca
Sachs, the Executive Director of Family Law Programs and the LGBT
Rights Fellowship at Hofstra. The law student reporters began their work
weeks before the Conference by drafting Issue Papers to guide the
Conference working sessions. Each Issue Paper focused on an important
facet of collaborative practice which would be the subject of discussion
at one of the eight Conference working sessions. During the Conference,
the student reporters worked with professionals from the legal academy
and from collaborative practice in facilitating these sessions. They also
made presentations summarizing the discussions and findings at the
Conference's closing plenary session.
In the weeks following the Conference, the student reporters
revised the Issue Papers and submitted them to me for editing. These law
students are in large measure responsible for this Final Report, and their
names deserve prominent mention, along with the topic for which each
student reporter was responsible: Michelle Dantuono (Informed
Consent); Jaime Birk (Withdrawal from Representation); Stephanie
Conti (Disclosure of Information Requirements); Joseph Lavin
(Interdisciplinary Practice); Beyza Killeen (Coercive or Violent
Relationships); Roya Vasseghi (Collaborative Practice in Non-Family
Disputes); Mary Ann Harvey (Access to Justice and Vulnerable
Populations); and Ashley Lorance (Training Law Students and Recent
Graduates).
The text of the UCLA, along with the Prefatory Note and
Comments by Professor Andrew Schepard, provide a detailed overview
of collaborative law.2 This Final Report will focus on collaborative
practice, and specifically on what Conference participants concluded
were the key issues in the field, as well as the rewards and risks of this
emerging practice methodology. Collaborative practice has been praised
as "a rising star in the realm of Alternative Dispute Resolution." While
(2010) [hereinafter UCLA]. Collaborative practice is the preferred term overall because "the
practice has grown to include not only lawyers but also mental health professionals, financial
professionals, [and] child specialists...." David A. Hoffman, Colliding Worlds of Dispute
Resolution: Towards a Unified Field Theory ofADR, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 11, 13 n.3; see also John
Lande, Principlesfor Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 625 n.27 (2007) (suggesting that collaborative practice is the more
appropriate term because it is "actually a multi-disciplinary process that often involves professionals
working in teams that include financial, mental health, and child development experts").
2. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 421-93.
3. Joshua Isaacs, A New Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The EthicalImplications Surrounding
CollaborativeLaw, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833, 833 (2005).
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it clearly fits within the scope of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"),
collaborative practice presents a radically new alternative to litigation.
More than any other ADR process, collaborative practice aspires to alter
the culture of lawyering by challenging the expectation that the lawyer's
role is to solve the client's problem. Collaborative lawyers are engaged
in shifting power in the legal system from lawyers to clients. The goal is
to empower clients to achieve the resolution they view as most
appropriate.
This Report is organized as the Issue Papers were, addressing the
central concerns of collaborative practice in eight parts. Part II deals
with the collaborative lawyer's extended responsibilities in assuring that
the client fully understands the collaborative law participation
agreement. Because the disqualification clause forbids lawyers from
representing a client in litigation of a matter which the lawyer handled as
part of the collaborative process, obtaining the informed consent of a
client to this relatively new concept is critical. Part III discusses the
circumstances which trigger a lawyer's duty to cease representing a
client in a collaborative process. Collaborative lawyers must withdraw
from representation if either party commences litigation in a
collaborative law matter, or if a client violates certain provisions of the
collaborative law participation agreement.
Part IV analyzes the disclosure of information requirements.
Collaborative practice disavows formal discovery. Instead, as the UCLA
provides, "a party shall make timely, full, candid, and informal
disclosure of information related to the collaborative matter without
formal discovery.'A This section analyzes the role of information
exchange in collaborative practice. Part V addresses issues in connection
with the substantial involvement in collaborative practice by
professionals with expertise in mental health, mediation, and financial
planning, often as third-party neutrals hired jointly by the parties. Part
VI discusses the UCLA's requirement that a lawyer "make reasonable
inquiry [into] whether [a] prospective party has a history of a coercive or
violent relationship with another prospective party." 5 This section
examines whether collaborative law may provide a reasonable ADR
method for victims of domestic violence.
Part VII explores the world of civil collaborative practice. While
most collaborative lawyers today practice family and matrimonial law,
the methodology has expanded to civil disputes generally. This section
considers particular concerns about collaborative practice in those areas.
4. UCLA § 12, at 483.
5. Id. § 15, at 484-85.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

572

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:569

Part VIII discusses key issues in access to justice and vulnerable
populations. Collaborative practice at present primarily serves wealthy
clients, because retaining a team of collaborative professionals for each
case is quite expensive. At the same time, collaborative practice offers
clients the potential for a less expensive and more durable resolution
than litigation. This section analyzes the UCLA's provisions modifying
collaborative law to afford greater representation to low income clients,
as well as several practical ways that collaborative practice may be
adapted to serve that same population. Part IX focuses on the education
and training of future collaborative lawyers. How should law schools
and professional groups allocate their resources to ensure the proper
development of this new practice methodology? Finally, the conclusion
suggests that the radical heart of collaborative law has the potential to
convert dispute resolution to peacemaking.
II. INFORMED CONSENT
Collaborative law's most salient feature may be the necessity forand difficulty in-ensuring that the client's consent to participating in a
collaborative law process truly be informed.6 Collaborative practice is
not yet well known among the general public, and potential clients may
be largely unaware of the process, and in particular its limited-scope
representation and disqualification requirements. Collaborative law
must be seen in sharp contrast to the traditional norm of the legal
profession, that a lawyer is generally retained for all purposes, including
litigation.
Collaborative practice constitutes a limited-scope representation,
"an attorney-client relationship in which provided services are limited to
certain agreed upon tasks." 9 A collaborative law process commences
"when the parties sign a collaborative law participation agreement." 0
This document reflects the parties' commitment to proceed with the

6. See id. prefatory note, at 457.
7. See id. prefatory note, at 428-34 (discussing collaborative law's growth and
development).
8. See Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A CriticalReflection on Whether a Collaborative
Orientation Can be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 15859 (2004) ("When a client decides to retain an attorney, the conventional assumption is that the
attorney will thereafter provide the full range of legal services necessary to provide a complete
resolution of their legal problem, including representation in court, if necessary.").
9. MADELYNN M. HERMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRO SE: SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANT TRENDS IN 2003: LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMERGING OPTION FOR PRO
SE LITIGANTS 1 (2003), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISProSeTrendsO3.pdf.
10. UCLA § 5, at 476.
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matter in a collaborative law process." In this "unbundling" of legal
services, the client must understand that the lawyer is committed to
12
providing less than the full range of legal representation in the dispute.
Model Rule 1.2(c) of the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provides that an attorney "may limit the
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent."13
The ABA Model Rules define informed consent as "the agreement
by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives." 1 4 Relevant factors
suggested by the Model Rules include the degree to which a client is
experienced in "legal matters generally and in making decisions of the
type involved."15 Clients unfamiliar with litigation and ADR may find
the requirements of collaborative law confusing and even overwhelming.
The Working Group also considered it noteworthy that many potential
collaborative law clients are undergoing the emotional and financial
traumas associated with family dissolution, thus making it imperative
that collaborative lawyers explain the process with extreme care.16 But
even seasoned users of legal services and those acquainted with
11. See id §4, at 474. "A collaborative law participation agreement must ... state the parties'
intention to resolve a collaborative matter through a collaborative law process . . . ." Id §4(a)(3), at
474.
12. HERMAN, supra note 9, at 1 ("These service agreements are often referred to as
unbundling, discrete task representation, partial representation, or limited representation."); see also
UCLA, prefatory note, at 440; Kevin Slator, A Look at Limited Scope Legal Assistance, MINN.
LAW., Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.mncourts.gov/lprb/fc08/fcl20108.html (suggesting that the
worsening economy may lead to increased use of limited-scope representation in divorce cases).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002). The Comment to this Rule suggests
its rationale: "A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives
for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude
specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives." Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 6.
14. Id. R. 1.0(e).
15. Id R. 1.0 cmt. 6.
16. See Spain, supranote 8, at 161 (suggesting that divorce clients may be "'in transient states
of impaired capacity to attend to long-term enlightened self-interest' calling into question even their
ability to give informed consent to limit the scope of representation to be undertaken through a
collaborative law process" (quoting PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 161 (2001))). But other collaborative
lawyers insist that even in very difficult matrimonial conflicts, counsel may help the client develop
"a rational sense of self to overcome fierce and long-held reactive emotions" toward his or her
spouse. FORREST S. MOSTEN, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE HANDBOOK: HELPING FAMILIES
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT 82 (2009); see also Susan A. Hansen & Gregory M. Hildebrand,
Collaborative Practice,in INNOVATIONS IN FAMILY LAW PRACTICE 38-39 (Kelly Browe & Nancy
Ver Steegh eds., 2008) (stating that "the collaborative lawyer must understand the emotional
dynamics of divorce in order to assist in effectively containing emotion and managing conflict
within the process").
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collaborative law's philosophy must engage in the rigors of informed
consent.' 7 Compliance with the standards set by the Model Rules is only
a beginning. Collaborative lawyers have a duty to advise their clients of
the risks and benefits of all dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as
their potential personal and economic costs. 8
The requirement that collaborative lawyers withdraw from
representing their clients should either client commence (or resume)
litigation of the dispute is a unique aspect of collaborative law, and thus
the feature most likely to be misunderstood. The conditions governing
withdrawal of counsel are more fully discussed in Part III of this
Report.' 9 The obligation to obtain the potential collaborative client's
informed consent depends to a great extent on the lawyer's ability-and
commitment-to ensure that the client understands the ramifications of
the disqualification requirement. 20 The interweaving of limited-scope
representation and the disqualification clause in establishing informed
consent may be seen in a 2007 ABA Ethics Opinion, which concluded
that collaborative law is a "permissible limited scope representation";
that the disqualification provision is "not an agreement that impairs [the
lawyer's] ability to represent the client, but rather is consistent with the
client's limited goals for the representation"; and that so long as "the
client has given his or her informed consent, the lawyer may represent
the client in the collaborative law process." 2
Before a prospective client signs a participation agreement, the
attorney must assess the appropriateness of the matter for possible
resolution within the collaborative law framework.2 2 The lawyer must
17. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 457; see also Spain, supranote 8, at 160.
18. See Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 156
(suggesting that in collaborative law, obtaining informed consent "certainly necessitates describing
the process fully; explaining its advantages and disadvantages vis-A-vis other dispute resolution
processes (e.g., litigation, mediation, arbitration, regular negotiation, etc.): and warning the client
explicitly about potential financial, strategic, and personal risks or costs"). The issue of advanced
training for collaborative lawyers is discussed in TrainingLaw Students and Recent Graduates,Part
IX, infra.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 451.
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).
22. UCLA § 14, at 484; see also Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in
CollaborativeLaw and the Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 237, 246-47 (2008)
(noting the importance of informed consent); Spain, supra note 8, at 158 ("An attorney offering his
or her services as a collaborative lawyer must . . . have the capacity to properly screen cases as
being appropriate for this practice model."). Although the UCLA mandates a written and signed
participation agreement, it does not require that the performance of the lawyer's obligation to obtain
informed consent be documented in a writing. The Working Group considered and rejected the idea
of mandating such a document, reasoning that compliance could simply be achieved by the client's
signing a boilerplate recitation of the relevant UCLA provisions. The Group concluded that the
better practice was to insist on the lawyer's obligation to fully inform the client, leaving the content
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also provide the putative client with adequate information in order for
the latter to make an informed comparison of the various processes
which might be appropriate for resolution of the controversy, focusing
on their "material benefits and risks."23 The alternatives to be weighed
include, but are not limited to, collaborative law, litigation, mediation,
arbitration, and expert evaluation.24 Participants in this Working Group
session noted that lawyers are not required to obtain the client's
informed consent prior to commencing litigation or any other form of
ADR, and suggested that the collaborative law framework might serve
as a model for other dispute resolution methodologies, with the goal of
enhancing client awareness and satisfaction. The Working Group
concluded that evaluating the risks and benefits of litigation or ADR is
at least as difficult as doing so in collaborative law, and assuring that a
client's consent is informed is equally arduous.
Counsel must also advise the potential client that the collaborative
law process is voluntary and that any party may terminate the process
unilaterally. 25 This requirement contains two components which should
be highlighted for a possibly unwary client: (a) in a matrimonial matter,
the client's spouse has the right to terminate the process, and the client
has no enforceable right to object; 26 and (b) any party has the right to
end the collaborative process "with or without cause."2 7 Further, the
process terminates automatically "if a party initiates a proceeding or
seeks tribunal intervention in a pending proceeding related to the
collaborative matter," and neither the collaborative lawyer, nor any
lawyers associated with him or her in practice, may represent the client
in court.28
and documentation to the lawyer. The UCLA provides that parties "may agree to include in a
collaborative law participation agreement additional provisions not inconsistent with this [act]."
UCLA § 4(b), at 474.
23. UCLA § 14(2), at 484.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 14(3)(B), at 484. Note that the various dispute resolution methods are not static
choices, but options in dynamic tension. For example, the greatly increasing popularity of ADR is
connected to the widespread dissatisfaction with litigation, particularly with the adversarial system's
cost, delay, and inflexibility. See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 426 (2d ed. 2000).

26. UCLA § 14(3)(B), at 484. The same right attaches, of course, to any party in any
collaborative law process. Id.
27. Id
28. Id. § 14(3)(A), (C), at 484. Note that the disqualification requirements of this section
allow for exceptions in specified circumstances. A collaborative lawyer may appear in court or
before a tribunal to request approval of "an agreement resulting from the collaborative law process,"
id. § 9(c)(1), at 482, or "to seek or defend an emergency order to protect the health, safety, welfare,
or interest of a party" or statutorily-specified household member. Id. § 9(c)(2), at 482. Attorneys
who work in a law firm "which represents low income clients without fee" will not be subject to
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Collaborative law's disqualification requirement calls for
heightened clarity in lawyer-client discussions. 2 9 In light of the
requirement, collaborative law is best presented not as one option along
a continuum of ADR methods, but rather as "a separate ADR operating
system."30 Clients may be investing substantial financial resources in the
collaborative process. 31 Should it fail, they may find themselves unable
to afford other methods of resolving their disputes.32 Even those clients
who understand the potential for disqualification are often unaware of
the potential extent of additional costs. 33 Further, in an effort to avoid the
financial and emotional toll which would follow termination of the
collaborative law process, a party may experience inordinate pressure to
settle.34 If disqualification occurs, clients must begin anew retaining and
building a relationship with an attorney entirely unfamiliar with the

case. 3 5
The Working Group participants emphasized that a prospective
collaborative law client has the additional burden of accurately assessing
the willingness of his or her co-disputant to participate fully in the
process, since as noted above, either side can terminate the process
unilaterally and without cause. 36 Collaborative lawyers must exercise
care in describing the benefits of interest-based negotiation, a process
with the potential to yield more satisfying and longer-lasting resolutions.
The danger, of course, lies in promising swift, painless, lower-cost
results that the collaborative process might not be able to deliver in a

imputed disqualification. Id. § 10 cmt., at 483. The same rationale excludes attorneys working in a
law firm representing government agencies or subdivisions from imputed disqualification. See id
§ 11, at 483.
29. See John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the
Appropriatenessof Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed Consent to Use Collaborative
Law, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 347, 383 (2010).
30. Gary L. Voegele et al., CollaborativeLaw: A Useful Toolfor the Family Law Practitioner
to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 987 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
31. See Lande & Mosten, supra note 29, at 369.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See JULIE MACFARLANE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE OF CAN., THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF
COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW (CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 25, 59, 64-65 (2005),

availableat http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/J3-2-2005-l E.pdf (citing a three-year study using
150 interviews of lawyers, clients, and other participants in the collaborative law process throughout
the United States and Canada).
35. The Working Group noted that clients involved in litigation also face discontinuities and
extra expenses when their legal representation is, for a variety of reasons, terminated.
36. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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particular dispute, despite its great success in many other cases. These
expectations might be frustrated if the process drags on longer than
anticipated, with expenses mounting far more rapidly than results.38
Some empirical data suggested that many collaborative law clients were
unprepared for the length of the process.
Before choosing to engage in collaborative law, clients need some
assurance that the process may effectively lead to a resolution of their
dispute.40 Screening procedures for the appropriateness of a particular
dispute for collaborative resolution vary widely in effectiveness.41 In
addition, unforeseen obstacles may arise when parties are less than
forthcoming with information or when the need for additional resources
is not apparent at the outset.42 Attorney training and experience may aid
in making assessments about the appropriateness of collaborative law to
a specific matter, but the range of variables involved suggests that the
process will remain one of art, not science.43 The Working Group
concluded that clients with realistic expectations of the collaborative law
process would likely participate more fully in problem solving and be
less apt to terminate the process.
The UCLA stresses the collaborative lawyer's role as an important
educator of clients.44 The Act aims to protect potential clients from
missteps by mandating that attorneys provide meaningful and targeted
37. See MACFARLANE, supra note 34, at vii, 25-27; see also id at ix (characterizing
collaborative lawyers as expressive of "loftier goals that, for some, bordered on an ideological
commitment").
38. See id at 25 ("[S]ometimes, clients who signed on for [collaborative law] largely because
of the 'promises' of speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution are bitterly disappointed with their
final bill and disillusioned by how long it has taken for them to reach a resolution."); see also John
Lande & Gregg Herman, Fittingthe Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation, Collaborative
Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 280, 284 (2004)
("Although the collaborative law structure is not inherently inconsistent with lawyers' professional
responsibility related to zealous advocacy, some clients may feel dissatisfied with their
representation due to the incentives created by the disqualification agreement and the norms of
some practitioners to press for settlement.").
39. See Michaela Keet et al., Client Engagement Inside CollaborativeLaw, 24 CAN. J. FAM.
L. 145, 145, 165 (2008) (reporting the results of small study of former participants in the
collaborative law process in Canada analyzing "the degree to which clients were meaningfully
engaged in the process").
40. See Lande & Mosten, supranote 29, at 361.
41. See id. at 383.
42. See id. at 381-82.
43. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 450; see also Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 999.
44. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 458 ("The act thus envisions the lawyer as an educator of a
prospective party about the appropriate factors to consider in deciding whether to participate in a
collaborative law process."). Forrest S. Mosten has argued that the collaborative attorney must
manage an expanded array of roles; including client educator, process manager, client counselor,
fact gatherer, legal researcher, negotiator and negotiation coach, drafter or ghostwriter, and
preventive legal health provider. See MOSTEN, supra note 16, at 48-50.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

578

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:569

information.45 Rather than providing detailed checklists, the Act
furnishes a solid conceptual foundation for practical implementation. 4 6 It
affords collaborative lawyers the freedom to represent their clients with
a measure of flexibility, tempered with adherence to professional
responsibility rules tailored to collaborative practice. Much work
remains to be done. But the present task devolves on bar associations,
collaborative law practice groups, law schools, and collaborative lawyers
themselves to develop standards to enhance the quality of lawyering and
encourage "best practice" norms to further assure that clients are fully
informed of the problem-solving options most suited to themselves and
their dispute.
III.

WITHDRAWAL FROM REPRESENTATION

This section discusses two types of situations in which a lawyer
must withdraw from representation of a client in a collaborative law
process. The duty to withdraw may be triggered by a client's
commencement (or resumption) of litigation of the matter, as well as
by a client's refusal to comply with the disclosure requirements of
collaborative law.48
The principle of mandatory withdrawal in compliance with the
disqualification requirement is exclusive to collaborative law.4 9 Barring
collaborative lawyers from participating in litigation is "a fundamental
defining characteristic of collaborative law."50 The theory of
collaborative practice holds that the best way to guarantee interest-based
negotiation and to avoid positional bargaining is to put the courtroom
beyond the reach of the lawyers.5 1 The disqualification requirement is
thus "the enforcement mechanism that parties create by contract to
ensure that problem-solving negotiations actually occur.',52
Collaborative lawyers also dissent, at least in part, from Mnookin
and Kornhauser's famous aphorism that bargaining always takes place
"in the shadow of the law."5 3 In suggesting that the legal framework may
not encapsulate the entirety of the parties' problem or potential solution,

45. See UCLA § 14, at 484.
46. Id.
47. See UCLA § 14(3)(A), at 484.
48. See UCLA § 14(3)(B), at 484.
49. See Voegele et al., supranote 30, at 978.
50. UCLA § 9 cmt., at 482; see also id prefatory note, at 426.
51. See Voegele et al., supranote 30, at 982.
52. UCLA, prefatory note, at 426.
53. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
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collaborative lawyers have observed that attorneys "who practice within
an adversarial paradigm are often myopic in their advice to clients by
limiting problem definition to what the 'law' proscribes and framing the
terms of settlements around what might happen in court." 54 In other
words, lawyers behave more collaboratively and become more creative
problem-solvers when the courthouse door is shut to them.
As discussed in the previous section on informed consent,
withdrawal from representation in a collaborative law case is mandatory
when one party terminates the process and commences litigation.
Ensuring that the client is aware of the circumstances under which
counsel must withdraw is essential to obtaining informed consent to this
type of limited-scope representation.56 Significantly, clients need to be
advised that in the event that either party submits the matter to litigation,
the collaborative lawyers for both parties are disqualified.57 The
Working Group advised that this provision should not only be discussed
at length with each client, but should also be detailed in the participation
agreement.
Withdrawal from representation may also become necessary as a
result of certain client behavior. A client who withholds or misrepresents
material information, or otherwise acts in bad faith, is violating the
collaborative law participation agreement which he or she endorsed.59
That agreement, which "state[s] the parties' intention to resolve a
collaborative matter through a collaborative law process,"6 o of necessity
includes a commitment to the UCLA provision setting out the
requirements for disclosure of information.61 A party is thus bound, "on
the request of another party" to "make timely, full, candid, and informal
54. Forrest S. Mosten, Lawyer as Peacemaker: Building a Successful Law Practice Without
Ever Going to Court, 43 FAM. L.Q. 489, 491 (2009); see also Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 98788 ("The disqualification agreement removes the participants from the shadow of the courtroom and
attempts to change the focus of the negotiation.").
55. See supra pp. 572-78.
56. See supra pp. 574-78.
57. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 425.
58. An alternative to collaborative law is "cooperative law." See Lande & Herman, supranote
38, at 284. This form of practice shares with collaborative law the commitment to interest-based
negotiation and voluntary disclosure of all relevant information. Id. But "cooperative law" norms do
allow the parties to retain their original counsel should litigation become the chosen alternative. See
MOSTEN, supra note 16, at 29-30 (discussing cooperative law); John Lande, PracticalInsightsfrom
an Empirical Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DIsP. RESOL. 203, 205-07
(reporting on an empirical study of cooperative law practice); Lande & Herman, supra note 38, at
284. Note that cooperative law's rejection of the disqualification requirement puts it outside the
UCLA framework.
59. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1018-20.
60. UCLA § 4(a)(3), at 474.
61. UCLA § 12, at483. SeeinfraPart IV.
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disclosure of information related to the collaborative matter without
formal discovery." 62 The provision also mandates prompt updating of
"previously disclosed information that has materially changed." 63 While
parties may "define the scope of disclosure during the collaborative law
process,"6 they may not do so in a way that contravenes "the
fundamental nature of the collaborative law process." 6 5 Because
"[v]oluntary disclosure of information is a hallmark of collaborative
law,"66 the thoroughgoing obligation to provide disclosure cannot be
waived or compromised.
Must a collaborative lawyer withdraw from representation upon
learning that a client has violated the disclosure requirements? 67 The
UCLA affirms that the standards of professional responsibility are
unaffected by the Act, and thus continue to apply to collaborative
lawyers. The norms of collaborative practice will always be in tension
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, since the latter
"are based on the dominant practice model of an attorney representing a
client as a partisan advocate in a traditional adversarial role." 69
ABA Model Rule 1.16 sets forth the factors to consider in assessing
the propriety or necessity of attorney withdrawal from representation.70
62. UCLA § 12, at 483.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. §4 cmt., at 476.
66. Id. prefatory note, at 455.
67. Note parenthetically that the UCLA does not specify sanctions for a party who violates
any aspect of the Act. See id. prefatory note, at 456. Sanctions are redolent of and inherent in an
adversarial legal system, and thus inappropriate to the collaborative law process. A party who learns
of bad faith behavior by a co-disputant may, of course, retaliate by terminating the collaborative law
process. See id. prefatory note, at 456. Knowledge that this unilateral power is entrusted to both
sides may serve as a deterrent to deviant conduct by either party.
68. Id. § 13, at 483 (noting that the Act "does not affect ... the professional responsibility
obligations and standards applicable to a lawyer or other licensed professional").
69. Spain, supra note 8, at 156; see id. at 156 n.99 (noting that paragraph two of the preamble
to the Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct states that "a lawyer's responsibility as an advocate requires
that 'a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."').
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2007). Model Rule 1.16 provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests
of the client;
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While this rule provides significant guidance on the issue, the particulars
of this type of practice may complicate the question. Collaborative
practice "challenges practitioners in ways not necessarily addressed by
the ethics of individual disciplines." 7 1 For example, Comment 8 to
Model Rule 1.16 permits a lawyer to "withdraw if the client refuses to
abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as
an agreement . .. limiting the objectives of the representation." 72
Collaborative law practice appears to satisfy Model Rule 1.16(c) because
the participation agreement generally protects clients by providing a
thirty-day grace period when the collaborative process is deemed to
continue after lawyer withdrawal in order to allow the party to secure
new collaborative counsel, should the party desire.73
The IACP has promulgated a series of aspirational principles,
minimum standards, and ethical standards to guide collaborative lawyers
and other professionals in various aspects of the practice.74 The Ethical
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer
or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a
tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a
lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably
practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has
not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the
extent permitted by other law.
Id.
71.

IACP, ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTITIONERS pmbl., at 1 (2008),

http://www.collaborativepractice.org/lib/Ethics/Ethical%20Standards%2Jan%20%2008.pdf
72.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 8 (2007).

73. UCLA § 5(g), at 477.
74. See generally IACP, supra note 71 (identifying
Collaborative practitioners must consider when making
professional framework to be followed by practitioners,
Collaborative practitioners with respect to their clients);

common principles and standards that
decisions, setting out an ethical and
and identifying the responsibilities of
IACP, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR A

COLLABORATIVE BASIC TRAINING (2004), http://www.collaborativepractice.org/lib/Ethics/IACP_

TrningStds Adptd 407_13_Corctd.pdf (articulating the substantive and procedural requirements
necessary to satisfy the minimum IACP Standards for a Basic Training in the collaborative process);
IACP,

MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR

COLLABORATIVE
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Standards aim to supplement, not supplant the Model Rules applicable to
lawyers. With regard to the lawyer's obligation to withdraw in the face
of client misbehavior, the IACP Ethical Standards provide an analysis
more fine-tuned to the collaborative practice dilemma:
9. Withdrawal/Termination.
9.1 If a Collaborative practitioner learns that his or her client is
withholding or misrepresenting information material to the
Collaborative process, or is otherwise acting or failing to act in a way
that knowingly undermines or takes unfair advantage of the
Collaborative process, the Collaborative practitioner shall advise and
counsel the client that:
A. Such conduct is contrary to the principles of Collaborative
Practice; and
B. The client's continuing violation of such principles will
mandate the withdrawal of the Collaborative practitioner from the
Collaborative process, and, where permitted by the terms of the
Collaborative practitioner's contract with the client, the
termination of the Collaborative case.
9.2 If, after the advice and counsel described in Section 9.1, above, the
client continues in the violation of the Collaborative Practice principles
of disclosure and/or good faith, then the Collaborative practitioner
shall:
A. Withdraw from the Collaborative case; and
B. Where permitted by the terms of the Collaborative
practitioner's contract with the client, give notice to the other
participants in the matter that the client has terminated the
Collaborative process.
9.3 Nothing in these ethical standards shall be deemed to require a
http://www.collaborativepractice.org/lib/Ethics/IACPPractitionerStandards.pdf [hereinafter MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTITIONERS] (stating the basic requirements that must be

met before a practitioner may advertise that he or she satisfies the IACP Standards for Collaborative
Practice in family related disputes);

IACP,

MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE TRAINERS

(2004), http://www.collaborativepractice.org/lib/Ethics/IACP-TmerStds-Adptd-40713-Corctd.pdf
(discussing the basic requirements that must be met before a professional may be regarded as a
trainer who satisfies IACP Standards for Training in Collaborative Practice); IACP, PRINCIPLES OF
COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE (2005), http://www.collaborativepractice.org/lib/Ethics/Principles%20
of%20Collaborative%2OPractice.pdf (describing the distinguishing features of Collaborative
Practice and its client-centered approach).
75. See IACP, supra note 71, § 1.1, at 1.
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Collaborative practitioner to disclose the underlying reasons for either
the professional's withdrawal or the termination of the Collaborative
process.
9.4 A Collaborative practitioner must suspend or withdraw from the
Collaborative process if the practitioner believes that a Collaborative
client is unable to effectively participate in the process.
9.5 Upon termination of the Collaborative process, a Collaborative
practitioner shall offer to provide his/her client(s) with a list of
professional resources from the Collaborative practitioner's respective
discipline from whom the client(s) may choose to receive professional
advice or representation unless a client advises that he or she does not
want or need such information.76

In terms of a collaborative lawyer's obligations, the IACP Ethical
Standards thus provide that the attorney should counsel the client that
withholding or misrepresenting material information contravenes the
principles of collaborative practice, and that maintenance of that
misconduct will necessitate the lawyer's withdrawal from representing
the client. Should the client persist, the attorney should withdraw.7 8
Under the UCLA, attorney withdrawal generally terminates the
collaborative process.79
But attorney withdrawal due to client misconduct is ethically
problematic.80 These concerns are heightened by the quantum of
attorney discretion in deciding whether and when to withdraw, as well as
the nature of the advice given to the client and the nature of the demand
made to the client to alter his or her conduct in order to avert the

76. Id. §§9.1-.5,at5-6.
If a client knowingly withholds or misrepresents information material to the
Collaborative process, or otherwise acts or fails to act in a way that undermines or takes
unfair advantage of the Collaborative process, and the client continues in such conduct
after being duly advised of his or her obligations in the Collaborative process, such
continuing conduct will mandate withdrawal of the Collaborative Practitioner and if such
result was clearly stated in the Participation and/or Fee Agreement, the conduct shall
result in termination of the Collaborative Process.
Id. § 7.1(A)(2), at 4.
77. Id. § 9.1, at 5.
78. Id. § 7.1(A)(2), at 4.
79. See UCLA § 5(d)(3), at 477 (providing that a collaborative law process terminates "except
as otherwise provided ... when a party discharges a collaborative lawyer or a collaborative lawyer
withdraws from further representation of a party").
80. Compare IACP, supranote 71, §§ 9.1-.4, at 5 (describing situations that require the advice
and counsel of the Collaborative practitioner, which may lead to his or her subsequent mandatory
withdrawal from the case), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2007) (illustrating
that an attorney may exercise discretion when deciding whether to withdraw from a case).
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lawyer's withdrawal from representation. ' If the client's recalcitrance
stems from a basic mismatch of client with collaborative process, the
conundrum may be due to inappropriate screening and/or improperly
obtained informed consent by the attorney at the outset. 82 The ethical
issues may be exacerbated if, facing the withdrawal of the collaborative
lawyer, the client has exhausted (or substantially spent) the material
and/or emotional means available to resolve the dispute.
Another aspect of this issue concerns the appropriate method of
withdrawal. Is an attorney ethically required to withdraw "silently"
rather than "noisily" in order to protect the client? 84 The IACP Ethical
Standards for Collaborative Practitioners provide for "silent"
withdrawal. Some support for this proposition may be found in Rule
1.6 of the ABA Model Rules, which prohibits a lawyer from revealing
confidential information.8 6 Requiring "noisy" withdrawal might run
afoul of Model Rule 1.7(a)(2), which bars representation if there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client, or a third person. While silent withdrawal is preferable,
the participation agreement may specify otherwise.88
In sum, withdrawal from representation stemming from obligations
pursuant to the disqualification clause is unique to collaborative lawyers.
But most of the other ethical issues surrounding attorney withdrawal are
not specific to the collaborative process. The nature of collaborative law
often necessitates a more particularized analysis of the issue, but always

81. See supra note 80.
82. See Lande & Mosten, supranote 29, at 355-58 & tbl.l.
83. See id. at 397-98.
84. Compare IACP, supra note 71, § 9.3, at 5 (noting that Collaborative practitioners are not
required to "disclose the underlying reasons" for withdrawal), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (requiring that "upon termination of representation" a lawyer shall give
"reasonable notice to the client").
85. See IACP, supra note 71, § 9.3, at 5 ("Nothing in these ethical standards shall be deemed
to require a Collaborative practitioner to disclose the underlying reasons for either the professional's
withdrawal or the termination of the Collaborative process.").
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6; see also id. cmt. 2 ("A fundamental principle
in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer
must not reveal information relating to the representation.").
87. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
88. Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) may also warrant withdrawal if the lawyer concludes that there is a
significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests. Id.
Collaborative lawyers must reasonably believe that they can provide competent and diligent client
representation, in the same way as trial attorneys must use good judgment when agreeing to
represent clients who wish to settle their disputes rather than litigate. See John Lande, Possibilities
for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualificationand Process Control in a
New Model ofLawyering, 64 OIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1373-74 (2003).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/5

16

DiFonzo: A Vision for Collaborative Practice: The Final Report of the Hofs

A VISION FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE

2009]

585

within the framework of the professional responsibilities common to all
lawyers.
IV.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

If informed consent is the bedrock principle supporting
collaborative law, voluntary disclosure is the link between philosophy
and practice. To facilitate a mutually satisfactory resolution, the UCLA
requires the parties to make "timely, full, candid, and informal
disclosure of information related to the collaborative matter without
formal discovery," and to "update promptly previously disclosed
information that has materially changed." 89 Unfettered disclosure of
material information allows the parties to make informed decisions and
reach intelligently negotiated agreements. 90 With no means to compel
discovery, parties depend on each other's candor, commitment, and good
faith in exchanging information. 91 This process of mutual reliance is
intended to foster trust and serves to reinforce the overriding message of
the collaborative process: that the solution to the parties' problem lays
within the* parties' grasp. 92
By contrast, formal discovery within the adversarial process
suggests that the information exchange must be mediated by lawyers.9 3
Discovery rules embody a regularized procedure, and courts are
empowered to sanction parties who withhold information or otherwise
distort or delay the process. 94 The UCLA contains no sanctions for
noncompliance with the disclosure of information requirements." But
the parties are not without recourse, since any party may terminate the
collaborative law process at any time for any reason. 9 6 Consistent with
collaborative law's emphasis on party interdependence, however, the
fact that either party may terminate the process at any time may induce
both parties to cooperate with the voluntary disclosure requirements.
89. UCLA § 12, at 483. The UCLA's disclosure requirements were discussed in connection
with Part III. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
90. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the concept of principled negotiation and the issues
that arise from its use).
91. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1018-20.
92. See id.; see also UCLA, prefatory note, at 426.
93. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1019.
94. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (regulating discovery and providing sanctions for
noncompliance).
95. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 456.
96. UCLA §5, at 477.
97. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, counsel for the nonconforming party may withdraw
from representation, thus effectively terminating the collaborative law process. See supra notes 5969 and accompanying text.
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. Additionally, the UCLA allows parties to "define the scope of
disclosure during the collaborative law process."98 Parties may thus
adapt the process to their specific needs, structuring their information
exchange to maximize the likelihood of settlement. But in so doing,
parties may not undermine "a defining characteristic of collaborative
law,"99 the requirement of a voluntary exchange of all material
information.
Informed, interest-based negotiation is crucial to collaborative law
and can only take place in a climate of candor and openness.100
Collaborative counsel must ensure that clients know and comply with
their full disclosure obligations. A lawyer's duties in this regard begin
before the process commences, with the requirement of obtaining a
client's informed consent.o'0 In order to maintain a secure environment
for candid and complete disclosure during the collaborative law process,
the UCLA deems all communications privileged and confidential.102 The
Act defines a "[c]ollaborative law communication" broadly to
encompass any statement, whether "oral or in a record, or verbal or
nonverbal, that is ... made to conduct, participate in, continue, or
reconvene a collaborative law process."l 03
Confidentiality is essential to any lawyer-client relationship. A
lawyer who discloses confidential information without obtaining the
client's consent is in violation of Model Rule 1.6.104 In the collaborative
law process, confidentiality is critical, "in much the same way that it has
been recognized as essential to the success of mediation."' 0 5 The
Working Group expressed a belief that careful attention by counsel to
issues of informed consent at the outset, and sustained client counseling
throughout, would greatly reduce the risk of inadvertent breaches of
confidentiality during the collaborative law process.'0 6 Attorneys who
believe that they are at risk of violating Model Rule 1.6 should attempt
98. UCLA § 12, at 483.
99. Id.§ 12 cmt., at 483.
100. See id prefatory note, at 455.
101. See supraPart lI.
102. See UCLA §§ 16-19, at 485-91 (confidentiality and privilege provisions).
103. Id. §2(l)(A), at 467. To qualify under the Act, the communication must "occur[] after the
parties sign a collaborative law participation agreement and before the collaborative law process is
concluded." Id. § 2(l)(B), at 467.
104. Rule 1.6 provides as follows: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by [another
provision]." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
105. Spain, supra note 8, at 168.
106. See Christopher M. Fairman, A ProposedModel For CollaborativeLaw, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 73, 94-95 (2005).
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to obtain their client's informed consent to the disclosure before
considering whether to withdraw from representation.10 7
What happens to the information disclosed during the collaborative
law process if the parties terminate the process? Parties concerned about
the risk that their data may be used in future litigation may be reluctant
to comply with the full disclosure obligations during the collaborative
process. 08 Without assurances of confidentiality, "clients may be
encouraged by their attorneys to withhold information that may be
adverse to their interests." 09 Such advice would, of course, destroy the
heart of the collaborative process. The UCLA's confidentiality and
privilege sections are aimed at creating what Jennifer Kuhn has
described as a "safe container."'" 0 Kuhn imagined the disqualification
clause as "a bubble around the parties and their respective attorneys.", ''
Those outside the bubble are unable to get inside or to have access to the
disclosed information.1 2 Kuhn reasoned that the parties' agreement to
negotiate in good faith and the executed disqualification agreement
provides the parties with sufficient protection to allow them to feel safe
in disclosing their information.113
The Working Group observed that, in practice, conflicts over the
disclosure provisions are often avoided when parties and their counsel
recognize that full and candid information exchange is more efficient in
achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution. Clarity of expectations is
essential in avoiding disclosure problems. But collaborative practice
thrives on reciprocity rather than concealment, and so the emerging
practice norm reinforces the disclosure obligations."14 This collaborative
standard also alters nomenclature: Working Group members noted that
collaborative attorneys often refer to one another not as opposing

107. See Gabriella L. Zborovsky, Baby Steps to "Grown-Up" Divorce: The Introductionof the
CollaborativeFamily Center and the Continued Need for True No-fault Divorce in New York, i0
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 305, 326 (2008).

108. See Spain, supra note 8, at 168.
109. Id at 169.
110. Jennifer M. Kuhn, Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement: Statutory Evidentiary
Safeguards Negate the Need for a Withdrawal Agreement in Collaborative Law Proceedings, 30
CAMPBELL L. REV. 363, 384 (2008).

111. Id.at383.
112. Id.
113. Id at 371 ("Because the clients and attorneys know beforehand that all information and
communication from the process is privileged, unless otherwise discoverable, the clients will feel
protected and safe while disclosing information."). Without the privilege and confidentiality
components of the UCLA, a client might well fear leakage of information into subsequent litigation,
particularly if the collaborative counsel were consulted by trial counsel or subpoenaed to testify at
trial. See Spain, supra note 8, at 169 (expressing similar concerns).
114. See Fairman,supra note 106, at 79.
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counsel but as collaborative colleague, thus furthering the culture of
trust and candid exchange of information essential to collaborative law.
The interdisciplinary nature of collaborative law complicates the
confidentiality assurances given in the UCLA."' The Act does not affect
the mandatory reporting obligations of the different professional
disciplines involved in collaborative practice."' 6 This issue is discussed
in Part V." 7 Further, the interplay of collaborative law's full disclosure
requirements with the UCLA's confidentiality and privilege provisions
also raise concerns in cases of domestic violence." 8 These issues are
discussed in Part VI." 9
V.

INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE

Collaborative practice is ardently interdisciplinary, with
collaborative lawyers calling upon professionals in forensic psychology,
mediation, and financial planning to join the collaborative team. 120 These
professionals are usually retained jointly by the parties as third-party
neutrals, although spouses in a conflicted divorce matter often retain
separate mental health professionals as "coaches" throughout the
process.121 While the UCLA does not seek to regulate the various
disciplines which regularly participate in the collaborative process,
practice groups are developing protocols for cross-disciplinary

cooperation.122
The substantial role played by a variety of professionals in
collaborative practice highlights the cardinal importance of informed
consent.12 3 Collaborative attorneys must explain to prospective clients
the functions which professionals from other disciplines might play in
the process, particularly since many clients are accustomed to the
traditional notion that legal matters involve only lawyers and clients.12 4
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See
See
See
See
See

UCLA § 16, at 485.
id. § 13, at 483-84.
infra Part V.
infra text accompanying notes 159-60, 172-78.
infra Part VI.

120. See generally MOSTEN, supra note 16, at 105-26; ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN,
COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES (2004)

(discussing the value of interdisciplinary approaches to resolving divorce conflict).
121. See Hansen & Hildebrand, supra note 16, at 40 (describing a collaborative coach as a
mental health professional who "assist[s] the client in managing emotional and psychological issues
that might otherwise impair the client's effective functioning and participation in the settlement
process").
122. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 995-98 (providing illustrations of collaborative
practice protocols for mental health and financial professionals).
123. See supra Part II.
124. See Spain, supra note 8, at 161; see also Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1015.
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Even though some potential clients will be familiar with the role of
experts in cases involving personal injury and medical malpractice in
tort litigation, they may be at sea in understanding the notion of jointlyretained professionals who owe their loyalty to neither client
individually, but to both clients collectively.12 5 Under these
circumstances, the discussion of informed consent must be rich and
exhaustive in order that the client understand the extensive role which
other professionals may play in the collaborative process. 126
Specific illustrations may be helpful for the client, and they may be
drawn from the lawyer's experience or the growing body of literature on
collaborative law. 12 7 For example, a mental health professional and a
certified financial planner may join the two collaborative attorneys to
guide the divorcing couple through the decisions involved in resolving
their dispute. 12 8 A mental health professional with expertise in child
development may assist the parties in devising appropriate visitation
schedules.1 29 Or a financial planner may facilitate the calculation of "the
tax consequences of the parties' decisions and help ensure that the
division of property and debt is still equitable after paying any required
taxes."o The norms of practice evident in interdisciplinary cooperation
reinforce the distance the collaborative process has placed between its
method and the adversarial system. 13 1
Because confidentiality standards and practices differ among the
professions, the participation agreement must specify which information
obtained within the collaborative law process will remain confidential. 13 2
Unless disclosure is otherwise limited, the UCLA requires the voluntary

125. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 976-77.
126. See Spain, supra note 8, at 161-62.
127. See Lande & Mosten, supranote 29, at 355-58 & tbl.1.
128. See Law Office of Marta J. Papa, P.C., Interdisciplinary Collaborative Law,
http://www.consideringdivorce.com/Interdisciplinary-Collaborative-Law.shtml (last visited May 25,
2010).
129. Id.
130. Id
131. Zeytoonian & Faxon have described how the collaborative law process can "liberate"
experts:
[Tlhe collaborative process transforms the way experts are viewed and utilized.
Collaborative, neutral experts are seen as a tool and a resource both for clients and for
the process as a whole. Just as the collaborative lawyers are freed up to be creative in the
interest-based process, so too are experts liberated to educate and advise the entire group
on the best ways to accomplish the clients' future-oriented actions.
Michael Zeytoonian & R. Paul Faxon, Two Legal Rivers Converge in Collaborative Law, HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV., Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.hnlr.org/?p= 132.
132. See UCLA § 16, at 485; see also id. §4(b), at 474 (allowing parties "to include in a
collaborative law participation agreement additional provisions not inconsistent with this [act]").
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exchange of all material information.'33 The Working Group believed
that the interdisciplinary component of collaborative law proved most
effective when parties have defined the scope of disclosure and
confidentiality in their participation agreements. At the same time,
informed consent is a continuous process, and it is impossible to predict
all the issues that might arise in the context of intense negotiations.134
Thus, while the participation agreement must be clear, it cannot be
entirely comprehensive. It must be flexible enough to adapt to evolving
party and interdisciplinary factors and to the attendant need for informal
disclosure as well as confidentiality.
The Working Group also found it critical that, since professionals
from various disciplines may be called upon to assist in the collaborative
law process, all must be treated as equal partners with each other and
with the collaborative attorneys. Lawyers trained in the adversarial
model often find it difficult to cede control to other professionals
involved in the case.' 35 In litigation, both the client and the lawyer
expect the latter to manage the case, including all witnesses and
evidentiary presentation.136 In that form of legal practice, professionals
from other disciplines are tellingly referred to as expert "witnesses," and
they perform their functions under the direction of trial counsel. 37 By
contrast, collaborative practice is what its name implies, and the
attorneys must yield their place of prominence in favor of a participatory
approach in which no professional dominates, but all work together to
assist the clients. 3 8
Because interdisciplinary collaborative practice is relatively new,
there are few frameworks in place which address the management of
cross-disciplinary ethical conflicts. Lawyers, psychologists, and
financial experts are developing not only working relationships, but also
guidelines for reconciling contrasting ethical standards.13 9 The UCLA
alters neither "the professional responsibility obligations and standards
applicable to a lawyer or other licensed professional" nor "the obligation
of a person to report abuse or neglect of a child or adult under the law of
133. UCLA § 12, at 483.
134. See Carie P. Mack, The Collaborative Law Process: A Better Way to Resolve Family
Conflict, http://www.macklawoffice.com/CM/Custom/Collaborative-Law-Process.pdf (last visited
May 25, 2010).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
138. See Mack, supra note 134.
139. See Law Office of Marta J. Papa, P.C., supra note 128; see also Ted Schneyer, The
OrganizedBar and the CollaborativeLaw Movement: A Study in Professional Change, 50 AlI. L.
REV. 289, 335 (2008).
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this state." 1 4 0 That provision merely clarifies the problem; it does not
begin a reconciliation of the sometimes conflicting disciplinary
obligations. These difficult issues should be addressed both in the
process of obtaining informed consent and in the subsequent
participation agreement, should the client consent to participate in a
collaborative law process. The issues may be thorny. While lawyers are
not mandated reporters of child abuse and certain other types of
violence, many other professionals must comply with those
obligations.141 At a minimum, the participation agreement should detail
the irreconcilability of these conflicting professional obligations. In
order that the client's consent to the process be an informed one, the
client must understand that the responsibility of non-lawyer
professionals to report abuse is not abrogated by the confidentiality of
collaborative law communications.142
As noted above, a party may employ a mental health professional as
a collaborative "coach" to assist the party individually to understand and
cope with the difficult interpersonal issues and emotional conflicts that
commonly arise in divorce. 143 The role of the "coach" is, however, quite
different than that of the traditional expert hired by the party as a
professional witness to provide testimony at a contested hearing or trial.
As with jointly-retained experts, the use and scope of individuallyemployed consultants should be detailed in the participation agreement.
The ethical obligations and best practices that govern the behaviors of
mental health providers and lawyers may conflict.'" Issues may arise
regarding the meaning of confidentiality, the duty to report information
to and about clients, the nature of preparation for client meetings, and
civility of communication style.14 5
One of collaborative law's goals in avoiding litigation is to reduce
the costs associated with contentious and prolonged court
proceedings. 146 But the various professionals who comprise the
collaborative team must be compensated, and clients need to understand

140. UCLA § 13, at 483-84.
141. See Joe Wheeler Dixon & Kim Embleton Dixon, Attorney-Client Privilege Versus
Mandatory Reporting by Psychologists: Dilemma, Conflict, and Solution 3, available at
http://www.psychologyandlaw.com/Dixon/ 20&%20Dixon%202005%20%2OAtty-Client/2OPrivilege%
20&%2OMandatory/o2OReporting.pdf (unpublished manuscript).
142. See UCLA § 16, at 485. See Alexis Anderson et al., Professional Ethics in
InterdisciplinaryCollaboratives:Zeal, Paternalismand Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. REV.
659, 690-709 (2007) (discussing the "mandated reporting conundrum" in interdisciplinary practice).
143. See Hansen & Hildebrand, supra note 16, at 40-41.
144. See Dixon & Dixon, supra note 141, at 11.
145. Id
146. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 427, 434.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

592

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:569

that while the collaborative process may be less expensive than a
similarly complex matter handled through litigation, there are no
guarantees which limit expenses.14 7 Nonparty professionals bring their
expertise to the negotiation process, often in ways not envisioned by the
clients and the lawyers at the outset.148 For example, the parties might
employ landscape architects, interior designers, and real estate agents in
order to maximize the selling price of a house so that both parties might
benefit. Estimating the cost of a collaborative divorce is not easy, but
much more difficult is comparing its expense to that of obtaining a
contested divorce in court.14 9 Certainly a collaborative divorce which
achieves a resolution would be far less expensive than the same divorce
obtained after a courtroom struggle, in which each side typically
employs its own team of experts. 5 o But if the collaborative process fails
and litigation ensues, the expense of the upcoming trial will be far
greater, principally because the disqualification clause mandates that
each party retain new counsel.' 5 '
If a party terminates the collaborative law process and initiates
litigation, the focus of interdisciplinary concerns shifts to the question of
what information these professionals may reveal in proceedings
law
collaborative
Generally,
litigation.15 2
with
connected
53
certain
But
under
privilege.
by
protected
communications are
circumstances, the privilege may be waived.15 4 The Working Group
discussed several problematic issues which may arise in the context of
prior professional relationships. If a client and a nonparty professional
engaged in a communication prior to the signing of the participation
agreement, then that communication may be admissible in a subsequent
legal proceeding should the matter proceed to litigation. By contrast,
client communications with professionals who had an established
professional relationship with the client prior to the collaborative law
process might be subject to claims of privilege. Another interdisciplinary
privilege concern relates to the threat of a claim of professional
147. See Voegele et al., supra note 30, at 1002-04, 1015; see also Norman Soloway &
Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., Why a Uniform Collaborative Law Act?, N.Y. DIsP. RESOL. LAW.,
Spring 2009, at 36, 39.
148. See UCLA § 17 cmt., at 487.
149. One additional consideration is the fact that the collaborative process requires that each
side retain counsel, while the parties in litigated divorces (as well as mediated ones) often proceed
pro se.

150.
151.
152.
1015.
153.
154.

See UCLA, prefatory note, at 434.
See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 33; see also Lande & Mosten, supranote 29, at 369.
See Soloway & Maxwell, supra note 147, at 39; see also Voegele et al., supra note 30, at
See UCLA § 17, at 485-86.
Id. § 18,at488.
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misconduct or malpractice. The UCLA provides that the privilege does
not extend to malpractice complaints.155 Finally, note that the privilege
generally does not apply to a communication "sought or offered to prove
or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation of a child or
adult."' 56
The Working Group also discussed interdisciplinary issues which
transcend even a successful collaborative process. The nonparty
professionals may want to continue their professional work with one or
both parties after the conclusion of the collaborative law process.
Professionals with a prior relationship with a party may want to resume
their practice. As with all other interdisciplinary issues, these concerns
should be addressed in the drafting of the participation agreement.
VI.

COERCIVE OR VIOLENT RELATIONSHIPS

The use of ADR processes by victims of domestic violence and
their abusers is a point of contention among those in the legal and
advocacy communities. 1s The question is whether ADR and, in
particular, collaborative lawyering, can safely accommodate family
members subjected to controlling, coercive behaviors by other family
members. Concerns for client safety can arise in all forms of ADR, as
well as in litigation, and are not necessarily more prevalent in
collaborative law than in other settings.' Still, the desire to respect
personal choice and facilitate self-empowerment is sometimes at odds
with the impulse to protect those whose ability to choose has been
eroded by prolonged exposure to abuse. In at least one sense,
collaborative law offers more client security than both pro se litigation
and mediation: the presence of lawyers for both parties helps ensure that
parties are safely and appropriately engaging in the process of seeking a
resolution.
Complicating the issue of whether collaborative law is safe and
appropriate for victims of abuse is the lack of any universal definition of
domestic violence.' 59 The term may refer to isolated events in which one
155. Id. § 19(b)(1), at 488.
156. Id. § 19(b)(2), at 488.
157. See generally Peter Salem & Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, Beyond Politics and Positions:
A Callfor CollaborationBetween Family Courtand Domestic Violence Professionals,46 FAM. CT.
REv. 437 (2008) (exploring the practical, political, definitional and ideological differences between
family court professionals who emphasize ADR and domestic violence advocates).
158. See Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce
Mediation in the Presence ofDomestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 202 (2003).
159. See id. at 152 ("Definitions of domestic violence are difficult to apply because domestic
violence encompasses a continuum of behavior that might start with ridicule and ultimately end in
homicide."); see also COLUMBIA LAW ScH. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW
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spouse assaults the other during an argument.16 0 Or the abuse may be
part of a pattern of control exercised by a chronic batterer.161 Domestic
violence may also vary in terms of frequency and severity and may
involve multiple perpetrators. 162 Each permutation raises its own
concerns and requires a distinct approach to dispute resolution.163
States also vary in their definitions of domestic violence, with some
statutes recognizing acts that cause emotional trauma and others
encompassing only acts of physical violence. 16 Domestic violence is
generally thought to occur within the context of intimate relationships.
But coercive and violent conduct may take place in any number of
interactions. 16 5 Not merely a legal concept but a symptom of a deeply
troubled relationship, coercive behavior can permeate a custody dispute,
a struggle over dissolving a business partnership, or a quarrel over
dividing the proceeds of an estate. 166 The UCLA has opted for the term
"coercive or violent relationship." 67 This term encompasses the
essential nature of relationships characterized by domestic violence, as
defined by the ABA Commission on Domestic Violence: "[p]hysical
abuse, alone or in combination with sexual, economic or emotional
abuse, stalking, or other forms of coercive control, by an intimate partner
or household member, often for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining power and control over the victim."l 6 8
Collaborative law is a voluntary contractual endeavor premised
upon the client's provision of informed consent. Clients trapped in
coercive environments where their will is subjugated to another's control
may not be truly free to decide to participate in a collaborative

CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: AN ADVOCACY MANUAL 17 (2010),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&fileid 163703
(citing the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the Elimination of Domestic Violence
against Women as recognizing that "domestic violence can take many different forms, including
physical, psychological and sexual violence as well as economic deprivation and isolation").
160. See Ver Steegh, supra note 158, at 152.
161. See id
162. See Salem & Dunford-Jackson, supra note 157, at 445-46; see also Nancy Ver Steegh &
Clare Dalton, Reportfrom the Wingspread Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46
FAM. CT. REV. 454,456 (2008); Ver Steegh, supra note 158, at 159.
163. See Salem & Dunford-Jackson, supra note 157, at 446; see also Ver Steegh, supra note
158, at 152-59; Ver Steegh & Dalton, supra note 162, at 458-59.
164. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 459.
165. ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING IN CIVIL

PROTECTION ORDER CASES 1, 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/
StandardsCommentary.pdf.
166. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 460.
167. Id. § 15, at 484-85; see also id.at 460.
168. ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supranote 165, at 1.
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process. 169 Other questions follow: Might some victims of coercive
controlling violence suffer so extensively from the abuse and its aftereffects that they lack the capacity to contract?170 Will some coercive
controlling perpetrators threaten and coerce victims into participating in
collaborative law instead of going to court?"' And, finally, if an
agreement is reached in the collaborative law process, how can it be the
product of two autonomous individuals if the abuser continues to exert
control over the victim during the negotiation?l 7 2
Additionally, there are concerns that victims of domestic violence
may suffer further harm by participating in a collaborative law process
which requires them to face their abusers in a setting designed for
rational thinking and strategic compromise. 173 The full disclosure of
information required in the collaborative process may increase victims'
vulnerability and compromise their safety.174 Even if further harm can be
avoided, there may be doubts as to whether victims are meaningfully
able to participate in the process, either because they fear their abusers
or because they are focused on seeking revenge, neither of which is a
state of mind consonant with facilitating interest-based negotiation. 175
Despite these concerns, collaborative law may offer some victims
of domestic violence a more satisfactory outcome than litigation, and an
important alternative method for self-empowerment. One important
caveat in this discussion is the financial wherewithal of a domestic
violence victim to retain a lawyer. Abuse victims may experience
difficulty in obtaining counsel either because the family's income is
insufficient or because, as is often the case in situations involving
domestic violence, the abuser maintains absolute control over the

169. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 460.
170. See Ver Steegh, supra note 158, at 195-96 (describing situations in which domestic
violence makes mediation unsuitable).
171. See id. at 191 (noting that victims of domestic violence may feel pressured to mediate,
even if they can choose not to participate).
172. See id. at 184-86 (discussing the potential impact of power imbalances between parties in
domestic violence situations).
173. See Kate McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist
JurisprudentialLens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459, 476 (2001).
174. See Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney
Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 730-31 (1993) (discussing confidentiality in the
domestic violence mediation context).
175. See Patrick Foran, Adoption of the Uniform CollaborativeLaw Act in Oregon: The Right
Time and the Right Reasons, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 787, 800-01 (2009) (stating that in
interest-based negotiations the focus shifts "from a party's desired end-result to the clients'
underlying priorities, needs, values, and objectives," and that the "principles of honesty, respect,
transparency, and good faith embodied within the collaborative law approach provide an effective
floor from which the parties are better able to effectuate their interests").
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family's finances.17 6 Victims seeking a collaborative resolution will be
frustrated, since the UCLA requires each side to be represented by
counsel.17 7 Those who seek court adjudication will be equally unable to
obtain representation, but may proceed pro se.
Whether the abuse victim has the assistance of counsel or is selfrepresented, he or she loses a large measure of control over the process
upon filing a court action. 7 8 The framing of the issues, the amount of
time devoted to considering each one, and the pace of the litigation are
taken from the hands of the parties and decided by the court, unless the
parties opt to remove the matter from the docket by resolving it
themselves.179 Whether the litigation results in a judicial decree or
prompts a negotiated settlement, enforcement of the terms is a judicial
concern. 80 If the abuser refuses to abide by the judgment, or chooses to
violate the terms of visitation, maintenance, or property division, the
victim must return to court for vindication, sometimes repeatedly.ist Any
orders of protection will be left to the police to apply and the court to
enforce. In many cases, effectuation of court orders necessitates further
contact between the abuser and victim, whether in courtroom
confrontations or-despite extant protection orders-at the victim's
home or work site.182 While there are legitimate concerns surrounding
the use of collaborative law in cases involving serious domestic abuse,
in some cases the traditional adversarial system may exacerbate the
underlying problems and protract the victimization.
The assertion that parties who participated in negotiating an
agreement are much more likely to comply with its terms has a fair

176.

See NAT'L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, POWER AND CONTROL WHEEL 1,

http://www.ncdsv.org/images/PowerControlwheelNOSHADING.pdf.
177. UCLA §4(a)(5), at 474 (requiring the participation agreement to "identify the
collaborative lawyer who represents each party in the process").
178. See Ver Steegh, supranote 158, at 176.
179. See P. Oswin Chrisman et al., CollaborativePracticeMediation: Are We Ready to Serve
this Emerging Market?, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 451, 456 (2006).
180. See Leah J. Pollema, Note, Beyond the Bounds of Zealous Advocacy: The Prevalence of
Abusive Litigation in Family Law and the Needfor Tort Remedies, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1107, 111718 (2007).
181. See id. at 1109-11, 1118 (discussing the legal system as an alternative means of abuse).
182. Seeidati109-11.
183. See id.; see also Lande, supra note 58, at 251. Additionally, the collaborative process may
provide a greater degree of safety since the UCLA mandates an ongoing responsibility for the
lawyer to monitor for domestic violence. The lawyer must regularly check in with the client, and
this frequency of contact may lead to more enhanced safety monitoring than is normally available in
the adversarial system, which specifies no safety monitoring responsibilities for any lawyers. See
infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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amount of evidentiary support. 184 The collaborative process affords
abused parties greater power over outcomes and may be instrumental in
restoring at least a portion of those parties' inner strength and selfesteem. 85 Collaborative law provides abused parties access to mental
health practitioners, coaches, and counselors to help in managing
conflict and manipulation.' 86 The issue is complex, however. Diverting
domestic violence cases from judicial control into collaborative law
raises the issue of whether batterers will be held accountable.'8 7 With all
its failings, the court system creates a public record and may provide the
victim with a greater sense of vindication.'"
Not all victims, however, seek a public reprimand of their batterers.
Collaborative law may serve their interest in privacy and empowerment
while still allowing victims to seek an order of protection during the
process, should one be needed.189 The UCLA provides an exception to
its rule barring collaborative lawyers from the courtroom in the event
that an attorney needs to file an emergency motion seeking an order of
protection.190 Filing such a motion, however, results in the termination of
the collaborative process.191 In sum, cases involving coercive or violent
relationships must be carefully evaluated to ensure that collaborative law
is actually a safer alternative for the victim than formal court

proceedings.1 92
The principal contribution of the UCLA in this area is the
requirement that a collaborative lawyer "make reasonable inquiry
whether the prospective party has a history of a coercive or violent
relationship with another prospective party." 93 This screening must be
accomplished "[b]efore a prospective party signs a collaborative law
participation agreement." 9 4 The Act also requires that, throughout the
"reasonably
and
the
lawyer
collaborative
process,

184. See, e.g., Foran, supra note 175, at 799 (discussing the benefits of settlements in the
divorce context when parties were actively involved in the negotiations); see also id. ("When both
parties take ownership of the negotiation process and the final settlement, the long-term results
include a stronger post-divorce relationship and more positive impacts on the children.").
185. See Chrisman et al., supranote 179, at 457.
186. See Foran,supra note 175, at 798.
187. See Ver Steegh, supra note 158, at 180-82 (discussing whether the private nature of
mediation will hold abusers accountable).
188. See id. (noting that the private nature of mediation may inhibit the prosecution and
conviction of abusers, thereby preventing the establishment of legal precedent and public record).
189. See UCLA § 7, at 480.
190. Id §7 cmt., at 480-81.
191. Id.
192. Id
193. Id § 15(a), at 484.
194. Id
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continuously ... assess whether the party the collaborative lawyer
represents has a history of a coercive or violent relationship with another
party."' 95 Moreover, the UCLA precludes a lawyer who "reasonably
believes that the party the lawyer represents or the prospective party who
consults the lawyer has a history of a coercive or violent relationship
with another party or prospective party"l 96 from commencing or
continuing a collaborative process unless the following conditions are
met: "(1) the party or the prospective party requests beginning or
continuing a process; and (2) the collaborative lawyer reasonably
believes that the safety of the party or prospective party can be protected
adequately during a process."' 97
These screening obligations thus form a significant component of
the lawyer's obligation to obtain the client's informed consent.19
Various screening protocols are available to assist lawyers in
satisfying this obligation, such as the one promulgated by the ABA.1 99
The Working Group doubted that any one screening mechanism can
identify all forms of coercive or manipulative behavior. Abused parties
are often reluctant to disclose information related to the violence they
have experienced, or may tend to downplay it.2 00 Moreover, attorneys
have significant discretion in judging whether the frequency or severity
of these incidents disqualifies the parties from participating in the
process. 201
In creating this responsibility to screen for domestic violence, the
UCLA does not prescribe special qualifications or training in domestic
violence for collaborative lawyers.202 The Act instead encourages
collaborative lawyers to be familiar with "nationally accepted standards
of practice for representing victims." 2 03 Knowledgeable and experienced
attorneys may be expected to be aware of situations requiring either
intervention or the need for greater expertise. But what about less
experienced collaborative counsel? The Working Group believed that
bar associations and collaborative practice groups may supply the

195. Id. § 15(b), at 484-85.
196. Id. § 15(c), at 485.
197. Id.
198. See id. § 15 cmt., at 485. Although the Act does not address the issue of malpractice
liability, the general consensus among the participants in the Working Group was that a
collaborative lawyer who fails to screen for domestic violence is committing legal malpractice.
199.

See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TOOL FOR ATTORNEYS TO SCREEN FOR

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1-2 (2007), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/screeningtoolcdv.pdf.
200. See Ver Steegh & Dalton, supra note 162, at 460.
201. Id.
202. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 463.
203. See id.
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needed standards and training. Lawyers may also enhance their
competence in recognizing situations involving domestic violence by
working with mental health professionals experienced in this area. There
are additional costs as well as benefits associated with utilizing mental
health professionals during screening, however. Lawyers should be
aware of the added expense to the client if another professional conducts
the initial interview to screen for domestic violence, as well as the fact
that disclosure of the abuse may not always be apparent in the initial
interview.20 4 If the lawyer relies too heavily on the mental health
professional's initial assessment and fails to utilize the screening tools,
the lawyer may miss later warning signs.
Another problem the Working Group noted is that a coercive or
violent relationship may not be detected until both parties' accounts of
their relationship are heard and compared, which cannot take place until
the four-way meetings following commencement of the collaborative
process.205 The Group contrasted mediation with collaborative law in
this regard. Mediators are charged with a domestic violence screening
function, and perform it by interviewing and assessing each party.206
Several other provisions of the UCLA address the issue of domestic
violence. Section 7 creates an exception to the stay of proceedings when
emergency orders of protection are sought "to protect the health, safety,
welfare or interests of a party or [family or household member]."2 07
Section 9(c)(2) creates an exception to the disqualification requirement
for a collaborative lawyer and the other lawyers in the collaborative
lawyer's firm when a client and/or dependent seeks such an order of
protection and other lawyers are not immediately available.208 Finally,
the Act creates an exception to the evidentiary privilege which otherwise
covers communications during the collaborative process in situations
involving threats of violence, 2 09 involvement or potential involvement in
criminal activity,210 or child maltreatment.211

204. See id. prefatory note, at 461-62; see also Lande & Mosten, supranote 29, at 390-91.
205. See Lande & Mosten, supra note 29, at 414-15 (discussing the limitations of the four-way
meeting).
206. See Ver Steegh, supranote 158, at 191.
207. UCLA § 7, at 480.
208. Id §9(c)(2), at 482.
209. Id. § 19(a)(2), at 488.
210. Id. § 19(a)(3), 488.
211. Id. § 19(b)(2), at 488.
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COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE IN NON-FAMILY DISPUTES

Although the benefits of collaborative law have been found in nonfamily law disputes (sometimes referred to as "civil collaborative
law"),212 the movement's spread outside its field of origin has progressed
steadily but slowly. 213 Advocates of the broader use of collaborative law
are working to expand their field, noting that the same reasons that make
divorce and other family disputes ideal for the application of
collaborative law exist for general civil disputes as well.2 14 Although the
non-family caseloads of collaborative lawyers are expanding, questions
remain on the adaptability of a form of practice developed for settling
family law disputes into an effective practice modality for resolving a
wide range of other types of conflicts. 215
Preserving existing relationships constitutes one of the most
significant rationales for resolving a family law dispute through
collaborative law. 16 The desire to continue effective working alliances
is not limited to family matters, but applies broadly to the handling of
disputes in our legal system. 2 17 Utilizing collaborative law to resolve any
dispute offers parties in conflict the opportunity to repair their
relationship in the course of coming to a solution, instead of risking
218
rupture in the process of winning or losing in litigation.
As one
contributor to the field noted, although there will always be adversarial
212. See Kathy A. Bryan, Why Should Businesses Hire Settlement Counsel?, 2008 J. DISP.
RESOL. 195, 196 (advocating the use of collaborative law techniques in business dispute resolution);
John G. Browning, Collaborative Law Promises a Kinder, Gentler Approach to Business Disputes,
D MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2009, http://www.dmagazine.com/Home/D_CEO/2009/SeptemberOctober/
CollaborativeLawPromises aKinder_Gentler _ApproachToBusinessDisputes.aspx
(explaining the amenability of the collaborative process for resolving commercial conflicts).
213. See David A. Hoffman, CollaborativeLaw in the World of Business, COLLABORATIVE
REV., Winter 2004, at 5-6, available at http://mdcollaborative.com/articlecollab lawworldof
business.htm (describing the resistance to Collaborative Law in nonfamily areas of practice); see
also Fairman, supra note 22, at 242-43 (noting that collaborative law is primarily only practiced in
the area of family law, most commonly divorces); Olivia Clarke, A Team Approach to Solving
Problems, CHI. LAW., Dec. 2008, at 58, 58 (noting the increase in the movement to utilize
collaborative law in non-family law cases).
214. The UCLA's prefatory note expressed the hope that "over time, as collaborative law
becomes more established and visible, more parties with matters in areas other than family and
divorce disputes will come to understand its benefits and invoke the benefits and protections of the
act." UCLA, prefatory note, at 450.
215. See Hoffman, supranote 213, at 5-6.
216. See Bryan, supra note 212, at 196-97.
217. See Clarke, supra note 213 (noting that the practice of collaborative law in non family law
disputes may be beneficial in other types of disputes where conflict exists side by side with the
desire to preserve an ongoing relationship); see also Chrisman et al., supra 179, at 457 ("Besides
saving the relationship by minimizing or eliminating anger, alienation, and regret, the collaborative
process preserves the parties' self-esteem and respect.").
218. See Chrisman et al., supra 179, at 457.
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litigation in the business world "much of U.S. companies' litigation
portfolios concern employees, customers, vendors, suppliers, contractual
partners, etc., where continuing relationships are paramount-especially
when conflict erupts."219
Many non-family disputes involve parties who are tied to a
contractual relationship guaranteeing their continued dealings after the
conflict is resolved.2 20 Utilizing collaborative law can make the process
of resolving the problem less adversarial and lay the groundwork for the
parties to extend and even improve their association. 2 2 1 Collaborative
lawyers may thus be seen as engineers in the contemporary legal
practice transition from dispute warriors to specialists in what Professor
Julie Macfarlane has termed "conflict resolution advocacy," not limited
to family law.222
The Working Group suggested that the use of a concise
participation agreement might facilitate the spread of the collaborative
law process in non-family law disputes. Family law disputes typically
generate longer, more involved participation agreements, while business
clients often seek more streamlined efforts.223 The Working Group
suggested the preliminary development of a "term sheet," a short list of
key points that the client would like to address during the negotiation.
The "term sheet" would be a precursor to the actual participation
agreement, but as a summary of the client's objectives it may supply a
quick and effective starting platform for the collaborative law process.
The informal disclosure process also protects the parties' privacy.
Litigation is inimical to privacy, as attorneys for both parties often
"search out and exploit-in a courtroom and in publicly filed
pleadings-every legally relevant shortcoming of the other party." 22 4
Similarly, in civil litigation, a company may be required to produce
"voluminous business records and defend numerous depositions"
exposing businesses to adverse publicity.225 Participation in the
collaborative law process, with the UCLA provisions for confidentiality
219. Bryan, supra note 212, at 196-97.
220. See Hoffman, supra note 213, at 8 (noting that transactional work lends itself well to the
practice of collaborative law because many lawyers trained in collaborative law also handle contract
negotiations and other transactions and "have acquired a reputation for collaboration").
221. See Chrisman et al., supranote 179, at 453, 457.
222.

See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: How SETrLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE

PRACTICE OF LAW, at xi (2008) ("[C]hanges in procedure, voluntary initiatives, and changing client
expectations are coming together to create a new role for counsel and a new model of client

service.").
223. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 457-59 (discussing participation agreements and the need
for informed consent).
224. Hoffman, supra note 213, at 4-5.
225. Id. at 6.
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and privilege, keeps the parties outside the glare of the courtroom and
mitigates the risk of adverse publicity.226
Additionally, the collaborative law process can significantly reduce
the cost of dispute resolution in civil cases.2 27 Collaborative practice
allows for the lawyers' billable time to be spent "directly working to
achieve a favorable resolution, as opposed to time spent complying with
civil procedural discovery requirements, motion practice or waiting for a
case to be called in court proceedings."228 Collaborative law techniques
such as jointly-retaining experts and compressing the information
exchange may also streamline the process.2 29
Adversarial bias, or the need 'to be right,' is at the core of rightsbased civil litigation and may be responsible for the slow spread of
interests-based collaborative practice in non-family disputes, an area of
the law which has not experienced as long and substantial exposure to
ADR as has family law.230 Since collaborative law is relatively new to
general civil dispute resolution, lawyers often lack appropriate training
and may not feel comfortable utilizing the process without the assistance
of an experienced collaborative mentor.2 3 1 The Working Group
discussed several remedies, including having a veteran collaborative
lawyer act as a facilitator of the civil dispute-resolution process. The
Group also suggested that an experienced collaborative lawyer could
serve as a third-party neutral in a negotiation process in which the parties
were represented by attorneys inexperienced in collaborative law.
Proposals related to training future collaborative counsel are presented in
Part IX. 232
The Working Group also considered the impact of the
disqualification requirement on general civil disputes. Even though the
disqualification provision encourages parties to keep negotiating until a
mutually-satisfactory solution is achieved, its very existence may

226. See UCLA §§ 16-17, at 485-86; see also Ver Steegh, supra note 158, at 180-82
(discussing the private nature of mediation as it relates to domestic violence cases).
227. See Bryan, supra note 212, at 197.
228. R. Paul Faxon & Michael Zeytoonian, Prescriptionfor Sanity in Resolving Business
Disputes: Civil Collaborative Practicein a Business RestructuringCase, COLLABORATIVE L.J., Fall
2007, at 8, available at http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/PrescriptionFor Sanity.pdf
(discussing the successful use of collaborative law in a restructuring a business).
229. Id. at 4.
230. See Hoffman, supra note 213, at 6 (suggesting that "the culture and sociology of litigation
practice" continues to inflate the prestige of trial lawyering at the expense of collaborative and other
ADR practices).
231. See Chrisman et al., supra note 179, at 455-56 (discussing the skills and training
necessary for collaborative lawyers).
232. See infra Part XI.
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dissuade businesses from turning to collaborative law. 2 3 3 Unlike many
individuals who seek out counsel for the first time when facing a marital
dissolution, businesses often have well-established relationships with
attorneys who routinely represent them in a variety of matters, ranging
from transactional to litigation. Such firms may be understandably wary
of a process requiring them to risk discharging familiar counsel in order
to retain and educate new legal representatives about their business and
their specific dispute, should the collaborative process fail and litigation
prove necessary.234 The truth is, however, that the vast majority of all
disputes submitted to a collaborative resolution process are successfully
settled.235 Businesses should therefore expect with some confidence that
most disputes may be resolved through representation by a collaborative
lawyer. If that collaborative attorney is the firm's regular counsel, the
firm may be even more prone to trust the arrangement. Additionally,
while the failure of the collaborative process to resolve a dispute will
necessitate the hiring of separate litigation counsel, it will not preclude
representation of the client by the original collaborative lawyer in any
unrelated business matters.2 36
Collaborative practice has become an attractive option for many
types of non-family law disputes where preservation of the parties'
relationships matters.237 Increasingly, businesses and other civil litigants
are realizing that a cost-benefit analysis favors adoption of a
collaborative process to resolve disputes.
VIII.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

Collaborative practice is designed to benefit any set of parties
seeking an interest-based, holistic solution to a conflict.2 38 But one major
disappointment to date has been the steep financial entry cost into
collaborative law. 2 39 As Gay Cox and Yulise Reaves Waters have noted,
233.

See Clarke, supra note 213.

234.

See id. (expressing a business client's concern or fear of losing a long-standing lawyer-

client relationship).
235. See SHERRIE R. ABNEY, THE ADDENDUM TO THE CIVIL COLLABORATIVE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT, GLOBAL COLLABORATIVE LAW COUNCIL 5, http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/

whythe addendum.pdf (noting that not more than one in every twenty-five cases leave the
collaborative process to proceed to litigation).
236. See Clarke, supra note 213. Note that the UCLA defines "[r]elated to a collaborative
matter" as "involving the same parties, transaction or occurrence, nucleus of operative fact, dispute,
claim, or issue as the collaborative matter." UCLA § 2(13), at 468.
237. See Hoffman, supra note 213, at 6.
238. See Chrisman et al., supra note 179, at 453; see also UCLA, prefatory note, at 425.
239. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 452-54; see also Gay G. Cox & Yulise Reaves Waters,
Penetrating the Walls: Overcoming Barriers to the Proliferation of Collaborative Practice in
UnderservedCommunities, COLLABORATIVE REV., Winter 2008-09, at 11, 11-12.
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"[c]ollaborative professionals naturally seek to be healers and yearn for
opportunities to offer the benefits of the process to a wider community,
but many have been frustrated at the pace of seeing the process
mainstreamed." 24 0 At present, the collaborative process is largely limited
to the wealthiest segment of American families. 2 4 1 The link associating
racial and ethnic minorities with poverty in the United States is a strong
one, and Black and Hispanic families currently have the lowest
household incomes.24 2 Minority communities are not well served by the
collaborative law process, since they are often economically
disadvantaged.2 43 A lack of diversity among collaborative practitioners
themselves has also been noted, and an undersized client base among
members of underserved communities has made referrals to these
practitioners even less common that they might be otherwise.244
Divorce rates among those living in poverty and with low levels of
education are nearly twice as high as the general population rates.241
Although this cohort experiences marital breakdown at a higher rate than
others, its low economic status leads it to have less access to legal
representation in divorce and other family conflicts. "The need for civil
legal representation for low-income people is particularly acute in family
law disputes." 2 46 Recent studies have found that seventy percent of
family law litigants do not have a lawyer on either side of a proceeding
when the proceeding is filed in court, and the percentage increases to
eighty percent by the time the matter is final.247
Despite one of the highest concentration of lawyers in the world,
the United States fails to meet the legal needs of the poor. 24 8 Eighty

240. Cox & Waters, supra note 239, at 11.
241. Id.
242.

See LUKE REIDENBACH & CHRISTIAN WELLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STATES OF

MINORITIES IN 2010: MINORITIES ARE SUFFERING DISPROPORTIONATELY IN THE RECESSION 1
(2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/pdf/stateofminorities.pdf.
243. See supra notes 241-42.
244. Cox & Waters, supra note 239, at 12-13.
245. See DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND
FAMILY FORMATION: WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DISCONTINUE, AND FORM 18-21 (1992)
(noting that couples living below the poverty line have a divorce rate twice that of the general
population); R. Kelly Raley & Larry Bumpass, The Topography of the Divorce Plateau:Levels and
Trends in Union Stability in the United States After 1980, 8 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 245, 249 (2003)
(finding that roughly sixty percent of first marriages among women without high school degrees
ended in separation or divorce, compared to slightly over thirty-three percent for among women
with college degrees).
246. UCLA, prefatory note, at 453.
247. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., STATEWIDE ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS 11 (2004), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/FullReport.pdf.
248. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE
AND THE PROFESSIONS 3 (2005).
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percent of low-income Americans who need civil legal assistance do not
receive it, and legal aid programs reject approximately one million cases
per year for lack of resources to handle them, a figure which does not
include those who did not attempt to get legal help in the first place.2 4 9 In
2002, there was one private attorney to every 525 people from the
general population.250 In that same year, there was only one legal aid
attorney to every 6861 people at 125 percent of poverty or lower.25 I The
structure of collaborative law is particularly problematic for those with
lesser economic resources. Not only are they less likely to be able to
afford counsel at the outset, they will be far less able to sustain the
financial consequences implied by the disqualification requirement
should the collaborative practice fail to resolve their dispute.252
The UCLA attempts to extend collaborative practice to low income
populations by minimizing the impact of the imputed disqualification
clause. After the termination of a collaborative process, "another lawyer
in a law firm with which a collaborative lawyer . .. is associated may
represent a party without fee in the collaborative matter or a matter
related to the collaborative matter," 253 so long as three conditions are
met:
(1) the party has an annual income that qualifies the party for free legal
representation under the criteria established by the law firm for free
legal representation;
(2) the collaborative law participation agreement so provides; and
(3) the collaborative lawyer is isolated from any participation in the
collaborative matter or a matter related to the collaborative matter
through procedures within the law firm which are reasonably
calculated to isolate the collaborative lawyer from such
participation. 254
This provision allows "the legal aid office, law firm, law school
clinic, or the private firm doing pro bono work to continue to represent
the party in the matter if collaborative law concludes."255 The relaxation
of the imputed disqualification rule for low income clients is intended to
induce lawyers practicing in associations representing indigent clients to

249.

See id.; Evelyn Nieves, 80% of PoorLack Civil Legal Aid, Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct.

15, 2005, at A9.
250. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 16 & tbl.5, 17 & tbl.6, 18 (2d ed. 2007).
251. Id.

252. See UCLA, prefatory note, at 453-54.

§ 10(b),

at 482.

253.
254.

UCLA
Id.

255.

Id. prefatory note, at 452-53.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

606

[Vol. 38:569

incorporate collaborative law into their practice.256 In addition, volunteer
lawyers are more likely to provide family law services when their
representation is limited to collaborative law.257 An attorney representing
a client pro bono could thus handle the collaborative portion of the
representation with the assurance that if the process fails, another
attorney in his or her "firm" could represent the client in litigation. This
UCLA provision is obviously limited, but it reflects an initial step
toward extending collaborative practice to a greater percentage of the
population.
Other proposals to reduce the cost of collaborative law include
having the parties limit the participation of other professionals in the
process whenever feasible. 2 5 8 Greater reliance on mediation-with
minimal or no participation by counsel-could be considered, with the
more expensive four-way meeting format reserved for any intractable
issues unresolved through mediation. 2 59 "Pay-as-you-go" models may
allow parties to limit their monthly expenses and pace the work
according to the available finances.260 Collaborative practitioners could
also agree to represent a certain number of clients at a reduced rate or
pro bono.26 1 While these alternatives may make collaborative law
available to a larger client population, care must be taken to maintain the
professional essence of collaborative practice while making it more
affordable. Far more extensive efforts are needed to make collaborative
practice an effective means of problem solving for the majority of our
population.
IX.

TRAINING LAW STUDENTS AND RECENT GRADUATES

Three major reports issued within the last two decades have
stressed the need to teach law students practical lawyering skills,
including negotiation and ADR.26 2 The MacCrate Report identified

256.

Id. prefatory note, at 453.

257. See Lawrence P. McLellan, Expandingthe Use of CollaborativeLaw; Considerationof its
Use in a Legal Aid Programfor Resolving Family Law Disputes, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 465, 471-72.
258. See Cox & Waters, supra note 239, at 15.
259. Id. at 15-16.
260.

Id. at 16.

261.

Id

262. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM §§ 7-8, at 185-99 (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 105-06, 111-14 (2007); Mary E. O'Connell & J. Herbie

DiFonzo, The Family Law Education Reform ProjectFinal Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524, 530, 532
(2006).
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practical skills as essential to lawyering.263 The Family Law Education
Reform Report regarded expertise in ADR as essential to the practice of
family law and recommended coursework in "mediation, mediation
advocacy, collaborative law, cooperative law, and advanced techniques
in negotiation." 264 Most recently, the Carnegie Report called for law
schools to foster "civic professionalism" by "linking the interests of
legal educators with the needs of [legal] practitioners and the members
of the public the profession is pledged to serve." 265 It challenged law
schools to match the first year's "emphasis on well-honed skills of legal
analysis" with "similarly strong skill in serving clients and a solid ethical
grounding." 26 6 What role does legal education have in teaching
collaborative law and practice?
The Working Group discussed several suggestions for enhancing
education in collaborative law and practice, aware that although the
orientation of many law schools has changed, legal education still
largely exhibits a "tendency to emphasize adversarial training."267 Law
schools could offer collaborative law seminars, 2 6 8 as well as relevant
skills courses, such as clinics or externships with collaborative law
practitioners or practice groups. The Working Group identified five core
areas in which law students needed additional training: (1) the
psychological components of divorce (including understanding loss and
anger), (2) ADR courses (such as mediation, negotiation, alternatives to
litigation, and arbitration), (3) interdisciplinary practice (working with
mental health and financial experts), (4) lawyering theory and practice
(professionalism, business/finance, interviewing, counseling, and
negotiation), and (5) client-centered or "humanistic" lawyering. 2 69

263. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 262, §7 cmts., at 190.
264. O'Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 262, at 525.
265. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 262, at 4.
266. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., SUMMARY: EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4 (2007), http://www.camegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/
publications/elibrarypdf 632.pdf.
267. Bryan, supra note 212, at 202.
268. In 2010, Hofstra Law School introduced a Collaborative Family Law Seminar, co-taught
by two collaborative practitioners, a lawyer and a psychologist. See Hofstra University Catalog,
View
Courses
by
Course
Title,
http://bulletin.hofstra.edu/content.php?catoid=38&
navoid=924 (select "LAW 2963-Collaborative Family Law Seminar" for description) (last visited
May 25, 2010).
269. The working group believed that law schools should incorporate the fundamentals of
client-centered lawyering into all core courses. Client-centered lawyering stems from the influential
work of Carl Rogers, the psychologist who pioneered client-centered therapy. See generally CARL
R. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS, AND THEORY
(1951). Client-centered representation was introduced to legal education by an innovative
interviewing and counseling text by David Binder and Susan Price. See generally DAVID A. BINDER
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Law students and recent law graduates are showing increased
interest in resolving legal disputes through an ADR methodology.27 0
Law schools have promoted this interest by offering a greater number
and variety of ADR courses. 2 7 1 However, lawyers and students serious
about the field quickly discover that employment opportunities in ADR
are limited, especially at the entry level.272 Those interested in
collaborative law face an additional hurdle: most collaborative practice
groups require a minimum amount of legal practice experience to join,
as much as several years for some practice groups. 2 73
Setting such a high threshold may deter many current law students
and recent graduates from entering the field. The Working Group,
consisting primarily of collaborative lawyers, generally agreed that
barriers for admission into collaborative practice groups no longer serve
a function and should be eliminated. Requiring special training for
collaborative law structurally disfavors entry into that form of practice,
compared with litigation or mediation fields, which do not have
particularized training requirements (as opposed to recommended
training programs).
The Working Group also emphasized the importance of training
new lawyers in collaborative law before, or while, they are trained in
litigation. Becoming a collaborative lawyer after years of practicing trial
law "requires rebuilding from the bottom up an entirely new set of
attitudes, behaviors, and habits."274 By contrast, the Working Group
favorably pointed to the standards of the IACP, the largest collaborative
professional association.275 The IACP's minimum standards for
collaborative lawyer practitioners include membership in good standing
in the lawyer's jurisdiction, twelve hours of basic collaborative law
& SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH

(1977).
270. See, e.g., ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Law Student Advisory Committee,
Committee Updates, http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR038000 (last visited May
25, 2010).
271. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Commercial and CorporateLawyers 'n the Hood, 21 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 769, 770 (1999).
272. See Marty Nemko, Best Careers 2009: Mediator, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 11,
2008, http://www.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2008/12/1 I/best-careers-2009-mediator.html.
273.

See COLORADO COLLABORATIVE LAW PROF'LS, MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA 3-9 (2008),

available at http://www.colocp.org/Portals/0/101%20Membership%2OCriteria%202010.pdf; N.Y.
Ass'n of Collaborative Lawyers, 2008 NYACP Membership Requirements (Lawyers),
http://www.collaborativelawny.com/join.php (last visited May 25, 2010); Cincinnati Acad. of
Collaborative Prof'ls, Becoming a Member of CP Cincinnati, http://www.collaborativelaw.com/I1_Collab-Group-Membership.cfm (last visited May 25, 2010).
274. See TESLER, supra note 16, at 24.
275. See Int'l Acad. of Collaborative Practice (ICAP), Standards, Ethics, and Principles,
http://www.collaborativepractice.org/_t.asp?T=Ethics (last visited May 25, 2010).
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training, a $135 fee, a thirty-hour facilitative conflict resolution training,
and fifteen hours of training in various related areas.27 6
Another Working Group proposal for facilitating entry into
collaborative practice juxtaposed the widespread lack of affordability of
legal services 2 7 7 with the need for law students and recent graduates to
obtain practice experience. Legal aid societies, as well as law school
clinics and externship programs, have made inroads in this direction. But
if law students and recent graduates are to provide collaborative legal
representation to the poor, collaborative practice groups must take the
lead in ensuring adequate training and competent representation. The
Working Group discussed two additional possibilities: linking legal aid
organizations with less experienced attorneys and mediators, and pairing
students in collaborative law seminars and clinics with collaborative law
centers or practice groups. Further development and implementation of
these ideas would benefit the recipients of the legal services, as well as
the providers who would receive invaluable training and experience in a
relatively new practice modality.
X.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative practice has radical aims. It seeks to change the
culture of lawyering and place clients squarely in control of their
conflicts and possible solutions. Shifting power from attorney to client is
a prime characteristic of the "new lawyer." 2 7 8 Many innovations in legal
education and practice, from training in client-centered lawyering to the
mainstreaming of mediation and other ADR methodologies, have
emphasized more careful attention to the client's needs and interests.
But collaborative law and practice move the dynamic one major
step forward. Jana Singer has argued that "[a]n overriding theme of
recent divorce reform efforts is that adversary processes are ill suited for
resolving disputes involving children." 2 79 Collaborative practice plays
that theme to its conclusion, by removing the formal adversarial legal
system as a framework for either analysis or resolution. The
commitment of collaborative lawyers to this process could not be more
276. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR COLLABORATIVE PRACTITIONERS, supra note 74, §§ 2.1-2.4,
at 1-2.
277. See supra Part VIIl.
278. See MACFARLANE, supra note 222, at xii-xiii ("Changes in the understanding of the
lawyer-client 'bargain' affect norms of decision making and control between lawyer and client, as
clients participate more directly than before in settlement processes and determine how much time,
money, and emotional energy to invest and in what type of resolution.").
279. Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

610

[Vol. 38:569

clear; as evidenced in the rule that while clients may abandon the
collaborative process to seek a remedy in litigation, collaborative
lawyers may not.
The eight substantive sections of this Final Report provide a sense
of the conversations within and conclusions of the eight Working
Groups at Hofstra's Conference on the Uniform Collaborative Law Act.
Based on the Issue Papers drafted and revised by the law student
reporters, these sections reflect the aspirations and frustrations of this
emerging new form of professional practice. But they speak most clearly
about the great potential of collaborative practice to convert problem
solving into peacemaking.280

280.

See Mosten, supra note 54, at 516-18.
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